

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00166 01 OF 02 221954Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 124503

P R 221855Z APR 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2571

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0166

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652; XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT FOR APRIL 22, 1975
(SALT TWO -625)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF APRIL 22, 1975.

QUOTE:

SEMENOV STATEMENT , APRIL 22, 1975

IN SETTING FORTH ITS CONSIDERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE
DRAFT TABLED FEBRUARY 1, 1975, THE USSR DELEGATION PRESENTED
DETAILED ARGUMENTS FOR THE ADVISABILITY OF INCORPORATING IN
THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED A PROVISION ON NON-TRANSFER
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES.

AS YOU KNOW, THE CORRESPONDING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS OF THE
SOVIET SIDE ARE CONTAINED IN ARTICLE XII OF THE FEBRUARY 1,
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00166 01 OF 02 221954Z

1975 DRAFT, WHICH PROVIDES FOR A MUTUAL UNDERTAKING BY THE

SIDES NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES, AND NOT TO ASSIST IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, IN PARTICULAR, BY TRANSFERRING COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUE-PRINTS FOR THESE ARMS.

THE NECESSITY OF ACHIEVING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON INCLUDING APPROPRIATE FORMULATIONS IN THE JOINT DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT IS DICTATED BY A NUMBER OF WEIGHTY FACTORS WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS FURTHER IN OUR STATEMENT TODAY.

THE QUESTION OF NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS, THE SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION OF WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, AND WOULD ENSURE THE VIABILITY OF THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE CONTRACTING PARTIES UNDER THAT DOCUMENT. WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT BOTH SIDES ARE EQUALLY INTERESTED IN THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT; AS ALREADY EMPHASIZED HERE, THIS FOLLOWS FROM THE CONTENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND FROM THE IMPORTANCE THE NEW AGREEMENT IS TO HAVE IN TERMS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND CURBING A RACE IN SUCH ARMS. THEREFORE, WE ARE CONVICTED THAT A PROVISION ON NON-TRANSFER, INCORPORATED IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, WOULD SERVE NOT UNILATERAL, BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, THE MUTUAL OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTIES THERETO, AND WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE TASKS OF STRENGTHENING THE FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE AND TRUST AMONG NATIONS.

I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN BANNING THE TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ARE OF MOST IMPORTANT SIGNIFICANCE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ENSURING THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, WHICH, IN VIEW OF THE MUTUAL DESIRE TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR, RECORDED IN A NUMBER OF JOINT DOCUMENTS SIGNED BY THE USSR AND THE U.S., IS OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE SOVIET, AS WELL AS THE U.S. SIDE

INDEED, RETENTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00166 01 OF 02 221954Z

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND OF ASSISTING IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT COULD AFFECT THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION, AND IT IS EVEN DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHAT THIS COULD LEAD TO. TO NOTHING GOOD, IN ANY EVENT. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THIS WOULD FUNDAMENTALLY CONFLICT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

IT IS CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC

OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES, OR ASSISTANCE IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVEMENT, WOULD SPUR THE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WOULD MEAN A BUILDUP OR WOULD CREATE THE POSSIBILITY FOR A BUILDUP IN THE STRATEGIC POTENTIAL OF THIRD STATES, AND COULD THEREFORE, REGARDLESS OF THE CALCULATIONS OF THE SIDE UNDERTAKING SUCH ACTIONS, LEAD TO THE KIND OF CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, WHICH IN ESSENCE WOULD LEAD TO INCREASING TENSIONS AND INCREASING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. THIS IS AN OBJECTIVE FACT, AND IT CANNOT BE IGNORED IN VIEW OF THE SCOPE OF MODERN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, PARTICULARLY WHEN SEEN IN ITS DYNAMICS.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

IN CONNECTION WITH CONSIDERATION OF THE NON-TRANSFER QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XII OF THE SOVIET DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE USSR DELEGATION, GUIDED BY THE SAME SPIRIT OF STRIVING FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION, WHICH PERMEATES THE SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC ARMS IN GENERAL, CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO DRAW THE U.S. SIDE'S ATTENTION TO FACTS INDICATING THAT THE U.S. ASSISTS THIRD COUNTRIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROCKETS WHICH COULD BE USED AS STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

BY WAY OF EXAMPLE I HAVE TO REFER TO THE EXTENSIVE ASSISTANCE THE U.S. IS RENDERING JAPAN IN ROCKET BUILDING. AFTER ALL, THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE BOOSTER ROCKETS FOR SPACECRAFT, BEING DEVELOPED IN JAPAN WITH U.S. ASSISTANCE, WHOSE CAPABILITIES EXCEED THOSE OF THE MINUTEMAN-III MISSILE, WILL NOT BE USED AS STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 00166 01 OF 02 221954Z

VEHICLES. IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS COULD HAVE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION.

IN THE VIEW OF THE SOVIET SIDE SUCH U.S. ACTIONS CANNOT BE REGARDED AS COMPATIBLE WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UNDERSTANDING ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

INCORPORATION INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT OF OBLIGATIONS BY THE SIDES ON NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATION BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT IN THEIR ENTIRE SCOPE, IN BOTH THEIR QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITA-

TIVE ASPECTS. THE FACT THAT THE NON-TRANSFER OBLIGATION WOULD BE MUTUAL AND, CONSEQUENTLY, WOULD APPLY TO BOTH SIDES EQUALLY, WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF CONSISTENTLY EMBODYING THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY IN THE NEW AGREEMENT.

IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE NON-TRANSFER QUESTION WOULD BE IMPORTANT NOT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, BUT WOULD ALSO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WOULD BE ONE OF THE OPERATIVE MEASURES FOR ENHANCING ITS EFFECTIVENESS-- IN WHICH, AS FOLLOWS FROM THE JOINT SOVIET-U.S. COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 24, 1974, BOTH SIDES ARE INTERESTED. WE WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT SOME COUNTRIES, INCLUDING NEAR-NUCLEAR ONES, AMONG THEM JAPAN, SO FAR ARE NOT EVEN PARTIES TO THE AFOREMENTIONED TREATY.

IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS THE NON-TRANSFER QUESTION HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY ADDRESSED BY BOTH SIDES.

JOHNSON

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PAGE 01 SALT T 00166 02 OF 02 221929Z

47

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 124180

P R 221855Z APR 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2572

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0166

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IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THIS PROBLEM, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ALWAYS CONSISTENTLY FAVORED A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION THEREOF FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENHANCING THE STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENTS UNDER PREPARATION.

ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT THE ADVISABILITY OF FINDING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE NON-TRANSFER QUESTION HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED REPEATEDLY BY THE U.S. SIDE AS WELL. THUS, IN SETTING FORTH ITS PROPOSALS ON A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THE APRIL 20, 1970 MEETING EMPHASIZED THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT "WOULD BE BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD SEEK TO CIRCUMVENT THE PROVISIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT THROUGH A THIRD COUNTRY."

AS WE HAVE ALREADY NOTED, AT THE APRIL 12, 1973 MEETING THE U.S. SIDE SPOKE TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON NON-TRANSFER AFTER THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. AS WE UNDER-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00166 02 OF 02 221929Z

STAND IT, NOW THIS ACQUIRES CONCRETE SIGNIFICANCE, IF IT WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE PRINCIPAL CONTENT OF THE FURTHER MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH MUST BE EMBODIED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985.

THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING AGREED MEASURES ON NON-TRANSFER HAS BEEN PROVED BY THE PROCESS OF PREPARATION AND CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS. CORRESPONDING OBLIGATIONS, FORMULATED IN ARTICLE IX OF THAT DOCUMENT AND IN THE STATEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972, CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS AND PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ENHANCING ITS VIABILITY. WE APPROACH THIS QUESTION IN THIS WAY NOT BECAUSE THE ABM TREATY CREATED A PRECEDENT, BUT BECAUSE THIS IS A REAL NECESSITY.

NATURALLY, ITS SOLUTION WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT CANNOT FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIFICS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BEING LIMITED. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, THE PART PLAYED BY LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN CREATING PREREQUISITES FOR AVERTING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR DICTATES THE VITAL NECESSITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON NOT TRANSFERRING THEM TO OTHER COUNTRIES. AS FOR THE SPECIFICS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN TERMS OF

WORKING OUT A PROVISION ON NOT TRANSFERRING THEM TO OTHER STATES, THEY ARE FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE FORMULATIONS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE IN ARTICLE XII OF THE DRAFT.

WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE INTEREST OF BOTH SIDES IN NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES IS OBJECTIVELY IDENTICAL AND SERVES THE INTERESTS OF WORLD PEACE.

THE SOVIET SIDE IS CONVINCED THAT MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS BY THE SIDES NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES, OR TO ASSIST IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, IN PARTICULAR BY TRANSFERRING COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS FOR THESE ARMS, MUST BE NAILED DOWN IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00166 02 OF 02 221929Z

WE ASSUME THAT THE U.S. SIDE WILL EXPRESS ITS CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NON-TRANSFER QUESTION. JOHNSON

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, SPEECHES, SALT TWO-625, SALT (ARMS CONTROL)
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GarlanWA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975SALTT00166
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750141-0136
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750428/aaaabafh.tel
Line Count: 301
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GarlanWA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 18 JUL 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <18 APR 2003 by BoyleJA, 3.4.X9, (SALT II)>; RELEASED <18 JUL 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <21 JUL 2003 by GarlanWA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT FOR APRIL 22, 1975 (SALT TWO -625)
TAGS: PARM, (SEMENOV)
To: STATE NATO BRUSSELS
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006